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In the preface to his Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Hu Shi wrote:
‘‘Today, the two main branches of philosophy meet and influence each other.
Whether or not in fifty years or one hundred a sort of world philosophy will finally
arise cannot yet be ascertained.’’1 Although uncertain, Hu was still hopeful, since he
believed that the two major traditions of modern world philosophy, founded in Eu-
rope and China, had finally met. That was in 1919. Now, almost a century later, we
can respond to Hu’s speculation with relative certainty: a world philosophy has not
arisen and is not on the rise. In fact, the situation is much worse: Chinese ancient
thought is not even considered ‘‘philosophy’’ by most Western specialists in the
field.
For Feng Youlan, Hu’s contemporary, this lack of recognition had become a ma-
jor frustration by the end of his life. Feng earnestly felt that ‘‘parts of classical Chinese
philosophy have a contribution to make to the elevating of man’s spiritual sphere
and in solving universal problems in human life.’’2 But on the last page of the last
volume of his New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy, completed a few
weeks before his death in November 1990, Feng concluded that Western philoso-
phers had not even begun to consider ancient Chinese thought to be worthy of their
attention: ‘‘Chinese traditional philosophy has always been regarded as a part of
sinological studies and is considered as having no relation to philosophy.’’3 Feng’s
sentiment is still widely shared today; for instance, in the Yearbook of Chinese Phi-
losophy for 2001, Zheng Jiadong remarks that ‘‘in the West, especially in Europe, the
legitimacy of ‘Chinese philosophy’ has always been questioned; ‘Chinese philoso-
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phy’ has to a large extent been considered a strange thing of questionable anteced-
ents.’’4 Others confirm that ‘‘Chinese thinking has been all but excluded from the
discipline of philosophy in Western seats of learning.’’5
Indeed, various eminent European philosophers, such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl,
Heidegger, and, more recently, Jacques Derrida on his visit to Shanghai in 2001,6
have proclaimed that ancient Chinese thought is not really philosophy. Kant, for ex-
ample, stated that ‘‘Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient. . . . Their
teacher Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed
for the princes.’’7 Even sinology scholars sometimes wonder whether ancient Chi-
nese thought ought to be labeled ‘‘philosophy.’’8 But more powerful than such
explicit rejections of the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese philosophy,’’ which are nowadays
relatively rare, is the dominant and implicit Western (especially European) view,
embedded in the organization of academic conferences, journals, university curric-
ula (as Feng Youlan remarked), and bookstores, that ancient China did not have phi-
losophy. The average European bookstore, for instance, does not display the Laozi or
Yijing on the ‘‘philosophy’’ shelf, but rather among various types of wisdom or prac-
tical knowledge, between Celtic myths, herbal medicine, and the art of astrology.
However unobtrusive, this organizational given reveals more clearly and influen-
tially than any contemporary scholar explicitly states, that the name ‘‘Chinese philos-
ophy’’ for the Chinese masters and some Classics is not proper—or, to put it in
ancient Chinese terms: this ming 名 is not zheng 正.9
The twenty-first century, however, has seen strong indications of change, not in
the sense that ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ is now being generally accepted as one of the
two main branches of world philosophy, as Hu Shi had hoped, but in the sense that
the debate has been reopened, both in China and in the West. In China, the appro-
priateness of the label ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ for ancient Chinese thought was ques-
tioned by some leading scholars in the first part of the twentieth century. But in the
last decade the matter has been experienced as a crisis and challenge, and has been
discussed much more broadly and vividly by Chinese academia: conferences are be-
ing dedicated to the question of the ‘‘legitimacy of ‘Chinese philosophy’’’ (Zhongguo
zhexue hefaxing 中国哲学的合法性), newspapers report on it, and some journals de-
vote whole forums to it.10 About one hundred articles or chapters related to the topic
confirm its proclaimed status as ‘‘one of the ten major questions in the field in the
year 2003.’’11 One scholar considers it a ‘‘historical challenge between Chinese
and Western philosophy, a major historical reflection of Chinese philosophy really
turning toward the world.’’12 In the West, there are also signs of renewed interest,
one indication being the thoughtful discussion by Rein Raud, in this issue of Philos-
ophy East and West, of my earlier article in a previous issue of this journal, ‘‘Is There
Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate.’’13
The aim of my new contribution here is threefold: to include views of contem-
porary Chinese colleagues in the debate, to reflect on suggestions brought up by
Rein Raud, and to elaborate on one aspect of the debate, namely the sensitivity of
the very question. ‘‘Sensitivity,’’ according to the Oxford Dictionary, means ‘‘subject
to restriction of discussion because of embarrassment,’’ thus combining the absence
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of discussion on the one hand with the presence of certain feelings on the other. My
focus will be on this combination in a broad sense: the relative absence of argu-
mentation and the presence of emotional commitment. There are various reasons
to focus on this topic. First, I am confident that other scholars, mainly from China,
are in a better position to come up with more arguments in favor of or against the
existence of ‘‘Chinese philosophy,’’ as they have amply shown in their recent publi-
cation boom. Second, I believe that the last part of my previous article, concerning
the ‘‘conflict of sensitivities,’’ has caused the most disagreement.14 My divergence
with Raud, for instance, is not on the status of ‘‘Chinese philosophy,’’ since we
both agree that there are many good reasons for attributing this label to a large cor-
pus of ancient Chinese texts. But we differ in our attitude toward the debate: while
he believes that the question can be settled once and for all as soon as Western phi-
losophers get rid of their institutional and ethnocentric biases, I think that, aside from
these biases, which Raud has convincingly analyzed, there is an aspect to the debate
that will leave it forever unsettled. The sensitivity toward the topic of ‘‘Chinese phi-
losophy’’ in China as well as in the West is not merely an indication of rational
weakness, power struggle, or chauvinistic sentiment, but also an invitation to reflect
on the nature of our deepest attachments.
I. The Periphery of What Is not Being Said
Sensitivities often remain unspoken. Discussions of the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese phi-
losophy,’’ therefore, tend to focus on various related matters surrounding this sen-
sitivity. The more a topic is being carefully—and often unconsciously—avoided,
the more the surrounding debates proliferate. Therefore, before leaving the beaten
track to focus on the topic of my particular interest, I will distinguish ten aca-
demic debates (seven very briefly in part 2 and three somewhat more broadly in
part 3) that are closely related to the topic—so closely that they easily risk being
confused with one another and monopolizing the topic. Without denying the impor-
tance of these debates, I will refrain from further elaboration, leaving them for others
to discuss.
First, the existence of ‘‘philosophy in China’’ and ‘‘contemporary Chinese philos-
ophy.’’ Probably nobody would deny that scholars in China who are studying Kant,
Husserl, or Derrida, are doing philosophy in China. Some, however, would question
whether the contemporary philosophical reflection on the Chinese tradition by such
thinkers as Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan, or Zhang Dainian is to be consid-
ered ‘‘(contemporary) Chinese philosophy.’’15 This essay, however, does not join this
debate but focuses on the legitimacy of the expression ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ for pre-
modern masters (zi) and some Classic books (jing) that have been commonly treated
as such since the beginning of the twentieth century.16 Before then, scholar-officials
entertained a tradition of teaching and writing that retrospectively came to be la-
beled ‘‘Chinese philosophy.’’ In addition to their reflection on issues that have since
come to be considered philosophical, ‘‘they also wrote poetry, painted, studied his-
tory, practiced rituals, engaged in self-cultivation, and in the course of things, gov-
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erned the nation, as well as much else.’’17 With the introduction of philosophy as an
academic discipline in China, this very tradition lost its age-old institutional support
and thus, paradoxically, died of its own birth.18
Second, the relation between the adjective ‘‘Chinese’’ and the noun ‘‘philoso-
phy.’’ If philosophy were considered universal in its claims, as positive science is,
the adjective would certainly create a contradictio in terminis: there would be no
‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ as there is no ‘‘Greek science.’’19 But even if one agrees that
philosophy is concerned with a Weltanschauung, a lifestyle, a cultural habitus, or
personal issues, one still has to specify in what sense a certain type of philosophy
(or philosophies), whether ancient or contemporary, can be considered Chinese. Is
the restriction imposed by the adjective on the noun relative or essential? And is
‘‘Chinese’’ to be understood in a geographical, ethnic, historical, national, or cultural
fashion?20
Third, the question of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy. Many scholars agree
that one major reason why the legitimacy of the label ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ remains
an unsolved matter is the lack of constancy, agreement, and transparency of what is
to be called ‘‘philosophy,’’ even in the West. As long as there is no general agree-
ment on the definition of philosophy, we cannot check the philosophical legitimacy
of concrete authors and texts.21 The whole question can, therefore, be considered a
false one, as Ge Zhaoguang has pointed out.22 Thus, rather than taking part in the
discussion, my aim is to describe and analyze the positions.
Fourth, the value of the ancient Chinese corpus related to the label of ‘‘philoso-
phy.’’ For many scholars in both China and the West, philosophy is a respectable
asset, something that any major culture should have. It sounds demeaning to deny
philosophy to others.23 Confirming the existence of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ is thus to
some extent recognizing the value of China’s ancient masters and Classics. But the
term is not necessarily or always used in this positive sense. Hegel, for instance, did
not deny that ancient China had produced philosophy, but he found it primitive and
unimpressive. For Hegel, ‘‘the teaching of Confucius . . . is a moral philosophy,’’ ‘‘a
certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom’’; he considered Confucius’ ‘‘origi-
nal works’’ so disappointing that ‘‘for their reputation it would have been better that
they had never been translated.’’24 The value of the Chinese corpus is thus not nec-
essarily guaranteed by the label of ‘‘philosophy.’’ Nor is it denied by the rejection
of this label, as Derrida pointed out when he visited China in 2001; without the
arrogance and disrespect that one reads in Hegel’s evaluation of Chinese thought,
Derrida insisted that ancient China did not have any philosophy: ‘‘Philosophy is
related to some sort of particular history, some languages, and some ancient Greek
invention. . . . It is something of European form.’’ For him, to state that ancient
China did not have philosophy is the same as having a Chinese claim that ancient
Europe had no Taijiquan (shadowboxing), hence nothing particularly informative or
worrisome.25
Fifth, being philosophically interesting versus being considered philosophy.
Denying texts such as the Lunyu and Laozi the label of philosophy does not neces-
sarily preclude their value for philosophers. Even though Heidegger claimed that
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‘‘philosophy speaks Greek,’’26 he nevertheless considered the Laozi a philosophi-
cally interesting text. For some philosophers, the most interesting fruits are to be
reaped beyond the orchard of academic philosophy.27 Hence, not considering a
particular ancient text philosophy does not necessarily amount to denying its inspira-
tional value for philosophers; on the contrary, the rejection of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’
is often motivated by a concern to protect the rich Chinese tradition from the profes-
sional straitjacket of modern Western academia. A major reason for questioning the
existence of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ is that ancient Chinese ideas end up being dis-
figured by a selection on the basis of their resemblance to traditional Western phi-
losophy or by an interpretation through that jargon, as ‘‘feet being forced into small
shoes’’ (削足适履).28 For this reason, Joe¨l Thoraval even argues in favor of a Confu-
cian, Buddhist, or Taoist anti-philosophy, in order to preserve symbolic practices
from the dominant academic philosophical discourse.29 This concern to save the
Chinese masters from philosophy is as old as their large-scale conversion at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, but its success has increased in the last decades.
While it used to be a topic related to the Western dominance in China, it has now
also become a matter of self-reflection.30
Sixth, a philosophical interpretation of the masters. This growing suspicion of the
philosophical approach that was promoted by scholars such as Hu Shi and Feng
Youlan, later narrowed down to the materialism-versus-idealism debate and finally
opened up again in the eighties, has instigated a lively debate over the interpretation
of ancient Chinese texts through (modern, Western) philosophical categories.31
Rejecting the name ‘‘philosophy’’ for the ancient Chinese masters does not mean
denying the similarities between ancient Greek and Chinese thought, nor does it
necessarily reject the possibility of a philosophical interpretation.32 That can vary
widely: while some may use the neologisms that were introduced into the Chinese
language a century ago (among which were a herd of terms ending in ‘‘ism’’ and
‘‘logy’’), others now try to go beyond them, inspired by hermeneutical, pragmatic,
Marxist, existentialist, or postmodern philosophical approaches.33 It is a fact that
many neologisms have to some extent become part of Chinese everyday language
and philosophical discourse.34 Moreover, since any form of interpretation is some
sort of translation through another language or new jargon—including the modern
Chinese reading of ancient Masters—it makes no sense to demand a purely authen-
tic reading of the ancient Chinese corpus, whatever that may mean.35
Seventh, the emotions and attitudes involved in the rejection of Chinese philos-
ophy and the response to it. The debate over the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’
is at times emotional or inspired by feelings, by nonrational elements, in both China
and the West. Attitudes that are often associated with the Western (European) rejec-
tion of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ are cultural chauvinism, imperial arrogance, institu-
tional resistance, and Western ethnocentrism. This criticism against the Western po-
sition is often expressed by Chinese scholars, sometimes by China scholars (among
them sinologists), and occasionally by Western philosophers such as Raud, who are
critical of Western pretentiousness.36 Emotions associated with the Chinese side are
concern with national strength, ethnic pride, frustration, and upsurging national-
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ism.37 All these attitudes are presented mainly in a negative light, as the unphilo-
sophical motives behind the positions, the emotions deluding rationality, thus defac-
ing the validity of the arguments. Without denying the power of these attitudes, I
want to focus on a sensitivity that cannot be totally reduced to such political, psy-
chological, institutional, or ideological disturbances.
II. The History of Names
Three more points are often mentioned in relation to the questioned legitimacy of
‘‘Chinese philosophy.’’ They all concern the history of terminology related to the
matter: the original meaning of the Greek term ‘‘philosophy’’ (topic eight), the mis-
sionaries’ presentation of ancient Chinese texts under the category of philosophy in
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (topic nine), and finally the invention of
the Chinese expression Zhongguo zhexue中国哲学 at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury (topic ten). The reflections on these three subjects are presented in somewhat
greater detail here because they form the immediate periphery of my topic: the sen-
sitivity of the debate in its relation to nouns and names.
Eighth, the ancient Greek meaning of the term ‘‘philosophy.’’ According to the
Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie,38 the first sparse occurrences of the Greek
words related to philosophy are uncertain and their meanings varying. The verb (to
philosophize) and adjective (philosophical) were used in the fifth century B.C. in a
broad sense referring to the ‘‘love of sophia (wisdom, knowledge, proficiency, famil-
iarity and insight),’’ prevalent among Athens’ free citizens joining the political sphere
and public debates. The term was used as a noun (jilosoji´a) from 380 B.C. onward
and defined differently by Socrates’ students in relation to the Sophists’ education in
public speech, but also in other arts such as geometry, music, and astronomy. While
Isocrates promoted philosophy as sound common sense to be practiced in politics,
Plato—with Socrates as his spokesman—stressed the difference between wisdom
(sophia) and the love of it (philo-sophia). Socrates’ basic attitude was one of not
knowing, but wanting to know, following the path to wisdom, and never arriving
there: ‘‘Whoever is wise or has knowledge, does not philosophize anymore,’’ he
says in an early dialogue.39 While in the later Platonic dialogues philosophy is men-
tioned more often and associated with the soul (as opposed to the body), Being, and
Ideas (as opposed to common sense), the striving for knowledge remains more im-
portant in Plato’s work than its possession.40
This overview of the birth of ‘‘philosophy’’ is relevant for several reasons, but not
for the reason why it is sometimes used, namely to check the nature of the ancient
Chinese texts against the so-called original meaning of philosophy in order confi-
dently to determine (positively or negatively) the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese philoso-
phy.’’41 First of all, because the most ancient occurrences of the Greek terms related
to philosophy (including ‘‘philosopher,’’ ‘‘philosophize,’’ and ‘‘philosophical’’) are
sparsely documented, their reconstruction remains tentative and debated. Second,
the overview shows that, already at its very beginning, the term had a variety of
meanings, changing even within the oeuvre of one author, such as Plato. And finally,
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we learn that the term increasingly occurred in arguments among Socrates’ students,
claiming what ‘‘true philosophy’’ is—a debate that lives on up to today.42 When re-
ferring to the original meaning of philosophy, we need to take into account the fact
that from the very beginning it was a matter of speculation and debate. The fact that
Chinese colleagues have joined this debate may be the best indication of its (con-
temporary) philosophical nature, despite continuous disagreements with and disin-
terest on the part of the Western side.43
Ninth, the attribution of the term philosophy by sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century missionaries to Confucius’ thought and to the Yijing. Here again, reference
to this label is usually brief and sometimes used as a support for the legitimacy of
‘‘Chinese philosophy’’: since Western missionaries were the first to call Confucius a
philosopher, why would that name not hold anymore? But in fact these accounts of
European missionaries describing Chinese philosophy shed light on the premodern
Western concept of ‘‘philosophy’’ itself rather than on the nature of ancient Chinese
texts. ‘‘Philosophy’’ was based on the categories of Aristotelian writings so that it
included logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and mathematics, which was further
divided into arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.44 According to Nicolas
Standaert,
For the Jesuits in the seventeenth century, there seems to have been no doubt that Con-
fucius was a philosopher and that [the] Yijing was a philosophical book. A major reason
for this different evaluation of Chinese thought was that they used a much broader def-
inition of philosophy than a mere system of thought guided by logic, though they con-
sidered dialectics to belong to the core of their own system. By the time of the Enlighten-
ment, the definition narrowed down, and for someone like Kant there was no philosophy
to be found in the East.45
A major change occurred in the eighteenth century, when Kant clearly determined
for the first time what philosophy was, as distinguished from science, and when he
established an inherent relation between the various domains of what he considered
philosophy, namely metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the social and political
sciences.46
The fact that premodern Europeans did not hesitate to consider Chinese thought
philosophy may not be a strong argument in the contemporary debate, but it is inter-
esting nevertheless. It confirms, first of all, that the concept of philosophy is far from
transparent or stable even in the West. The question as to whether or not Chinese
thought should be considered philosophy is relatively recent and emerging from
the narrowing and the specification of the concept in our own history. It is often for-
gotten that this view of philosophy, with its strict demand for system and division
into domains, is itself the result of a particular historical context. Second, the mission-
ary’s acceptance of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ also confirms the open-endedness of the
debate as to what philosophy is: it shows that since the seventeenth century it is
the Western expectations concerning philosophy that have changed rather than the
ancient Chinese texts that are now being considered not philosophical. A third inter-
esting consequence of this tolerant view is that one could choose to revitalize a non-
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academic and more practical way of doing philosophy, less burdened by the ‘‘schol-
arly teaching of philosophy and especially of the history of philosophy, which has
always had a tendency to insist on the theoretical, abstract, and conceptual aspect
of philosophy.’’47 Although Pierre Hadot’s defense of a philosophy that originates in
and leads back to a lifestyle is inspired by ancient Western thought, he senses that
this view may breach the modern gap between East and West: ‘‘It seems to me now
. . . that there really are troubling analogies between the philosophical attitudes of
Antiquity and those of the East’’ and that ‘‘the Ancients were perhaps closer to the
East than we are.’’48
Tenth, the history of the expressions for Chinese philosophy since the late nine-
teenth century.49 The contemporary Chinese term for ‘‘philosophy’’ (zhexue 哲学)
did not exist in ancient China; it was coined in Japan on the basis of the words for
‘‘wisdom’’ and ‘‘learning.’’ Tetsugaku 哲学 was one of the Japanese terms used for
‘‘philosophy.’’ Nishi Amane (or Kono) introduced it in his translation of Western phi-
losophy (in 1873) in order to distinguish the latter from Eastern thought, which was
dominated by Confucianism. But the term went its own way, so that Tokyo Univer-
sity initiated a Chair in ‘‘Chinese Literature and Chinese Philosophy’’ in 1881, and
Peking University had its ‘‘Chinese Philosophy Section’’ (Zhongguo Zhexue Men) in
1914. Early on, Chinese scholars used the expression zhexue in relation to Chinese
thought; among them were Liang Qichao (1902), Wang Guowei (1905), Liu Shipei
(1906), and Xie Wuliang (1916), followed by Hu Shi (1917), Liang Shuming (1921),
Feng Youlan (1930), Fan Shoukang (1937), Zhao Jibin (1939), Zhang Dainian (1937),
and many others. The various episodes of this evolution, which some have called ‘‘a
historical mistake,’’50 have been fairly well documented on the basis of translations
of Western books, titles of university departments and courses, and early articles and
books using the expression, first in Japan and then in China.51
The implications involved in the creation of philosophy departments and the
retrospective application of philosophy to the corpus of ancient Chinese texts can
hardly be overstated. There was a strong political and psychological urge to take
part in this radical change: the majority of Chinese intellectuals believed that the re-
interpretation of their ancient masters was necessary for communicating and com-
peting with the West.52 But questions were asked as to whether Chinese thought
was philosophy; if so, which part of it was and what type of philosophy it was; and
what its value was compared to Western philosophy, its relevance to the world, its
interpretation in Western versus Chinese categories, and its influence on the concept
of philosophy itself.
III. The Silence Surrounding Sensitivity
Discussions about the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy tend to focus on one or
more of the ten topics outlined above, not always clearly distinguished. In relegating
these debates to the periphery I do not mean to minimize their importance. On the
contrary, I am convinced that the histories of the terminology involved are impor-
tant, as are reflections about the value of ancient Chinese thought, its philosophical
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relevance, the meaning of the term philosophy, and the implications of philosophi-
cal jargon and institutions. I have relegated all these debates to the periphery only in
order to distinguish them from the topic that they tend to suffocate with an overdose
of arguments and data.
One may wonder what else remains to be said when this whole periphery has
been fully examined. Perhaps not very much, but enough to hold our attention for a
while. Of course, I would not have put aside all the surrounding debates if I were not
convinced that something important is consistently being left out; in other words,
that all the other debates are really in a sense the periphery of something more cru-
cial. I believe that the weakness of the arguments in favor of Chinese philosophy on
the one hand and the deafness on the part of mainly Western philosophers on the
other cannot be exclusively attributed to nationalist, chauvinistic, or ethnocentric
reactions. They are also the result of our relation to the concept of (Chinese) philos-
ophy, a topic that is sensitive on both sides of the globe.
The problem with sensitive topics is that people avoid them. The present search
will hence first be an exercise in noticing what is not there, what is not being explic-
itly said. Searching for what is absent is a difficult quest, which can of course never
be exhaustive.53 A reading of the prefaces and introductory chapters of standard
works on Chinese philosophy shows that its legitimacy is largely assumed. Only a
minority of all the scholars working on Chinese philosophy explicitly tackle this
question. The most lively periods of debate were, first, at the introduction of the
concept of Chinese philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century and, second,
during the period of self-reflection beginning at the end of the twentieth century. De-
spite the real concern of these scholars with the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy in
these two periods—or perhaps because of it?—they have not provided any conclu-
sive argumentation as to whether it actually exists.
The Introduction of Something New but Very Old at the Beginning of the Twentieth
Century
For the first period, I will focus on those two thinkers whose work was substantial in
the retrospective discovery or creation of Chinese philosophy: Hu Shi (1891–1962)
and Feng Youlan (1895–1990).54 Both presentations of Chinese philosophy in its
historical evolution describe something relatively new and unknown, but at the
same time age-old and very valuable. Although, in this new combination of East
and West, ‘‘philosophy’’ is the foreign part while the ‘‘Chinese’’ texts are relatively
familiar, it is the former that is passed over rather lightly. Many Chinese contempo-
raries of Hu and Feng have applauded the two prominent initiators of Chinese
philosophy and have ‘‘unconsciously started using the term ‘philosophy’.’’55 Some
have criticized them for various reasons, but only a very few, to my knowledge,
have consistently questioned their easy acceptance of the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese
philosophy.’’56
Hu Shi, for instance, does not directly treat the legitimacy of Chinese philoso-
phy, although it constitutes the cornerstone of his work. The introduction of his
Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang (Outline of Chinese philosophy) begins with the state-
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ment, ‘‘The definition of philosophy has never been fixed. I will for the moment tem-
porarily make a definition: ‘In general, a discipline that studies the most important
questions of human life, a fundamental reflection that wants to find a fundamental
solution to these questions: this is called philosophy’.’’57 He then shows, but with-
out much argumentation, that China possessed one of the world’s two major phi-
losophies. Not only does Hu Shi treat his definition as relatively unimportant and
generally accepted, he also considers the Chinese appropriation of the term quite
unproblematic.58
Something similar happens in Feng Youlan’s work. The introduction to the first
volume of his A History of Chinese Philosophy, translated and rewritten by Derk
Bodde and Feng Youlan, focuses on three points: the nature of Chinese philosophy,
the claim that it lacks system, and the claim that it lacks progressive growth. It does
not begin by arguing that the subject matter of his book exists. Perhaps the oversight
can be explained by the fact that we are looking at a partial translation from which,
as Bodde explains, ‘‘portions, which it was felt would be of less interest to west-
erners, have been omitted.’’59 Conscious omissions, made by Bodde in consultation
with Feng Youlan, may be an interesting starting point to read what was once there
but is now being left out. Indeed, the Chinese edition begins with a reflection on the
content of philosophy: ‘‘Philosophy is a Western term. An important task now, if one
wishes to discuss the history of Chinese philosophy, is to select and narrate what in
all types of learning throughout Chinese history can be named according to what the
West calls philosophy.’’ It also indicates that ‘‘The term philosophy has known a
long history in the West, and each philosopher’s definition of philosophy is different.
For the sake of convenience, I will now describe what is generally considered the
content of philosophy. Once we know its content, we can then know what sort of
thing it is and we don’t need to mention any other formal definition of the term.’’60
Having thus remarked that there is no fixed definition of philosophy, Feng makes
a temporary, demonstrative definition in order to proceed with what really matters to
him: to show that some ancient Chinese thinkers did exactly that. He determines,
both in the Chinese and the English versions, what has always belonged to philoso-
phy, from Plato onwards—physics, ethics, and logic.61 Then he searches the Chi-
nese corpus of texts for similarities or he explains their absence. The next passage
literally occurs in the English edition, arranging philosophy along with ‘‘learning of
the mystery’’ (xuanxue) in the Wei and Jin dynasties, ‘‘learning of the truth’’ (daoxue)
in the Song and Ming, and ‘‘learning of the principles’’ (yili zhi xue 義理之學) in the
Qing, and concludes that ‘‘we find that these problems resemble to a considerable
degree those of western philosophy.’’62 And finally, Feng indicates, again for Chi-
nese readers alone, that one could just as well write a history of the yili zhi xue of
China and even of the West, but that philosophy is in fact a better alternative since it
is a modern concept from the West that fits better with all other current modern types
of learning introduced into China. ‘‘This is why recently there have only been works
on the history of Chinese philosophy and none on the history of Western yili zhi xue.
Therefore, below I will always use the terms ‘Chinese philosophy’ and ‘Chinese
philosopher’.’’63
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What does all this say about things left unsaid? As Wu Xiao-ming remarks, in
Feng Youlan’s work ‘‘the original Western word ‘philosophy’ is taken for granted
from the very beginning as a suitable name for Chinese thought and culture. There
is no question concerning the concept or the name ‘philosophy’ itself.’’64 Indeed, in
all Feng Youlan’s subtle reflections on philosophy and on the ancient Chinese mas-
ters, their basic correspondence is largely taken for granted. Feng’s various defini-
tions of the concept of philosophy throughout his career confirm this assumption of
familiarity.65 It is obvious for him that philosophy has something to do with a ratio-
nal, systematic, original, subdivided inquiry into fundamental matters of human life
and the world. The core of his work, the presentation of ancient Chinese thought as
philosophy, is shrouded in vagueness and constitutes a vicious circle: on the basis of
a particular, modern Western, neorealist view of philosophy, Feng makes a selection
from the Chinese corpus, and on the basis of these texts, he is willing to adapt his
search for philosophy.66 For instance, when the ancient masters do not appear to
be systematic at all, Feng explains that they lack a ‘‘formal’’ system, but that the his-
torian’s task is to search for the ‘‘real’’ system in their thought.
This lack of argumentation is not something to hold against Feng. Every system
of thought is constructed on the basis of some axioms, some unfounded principles;
moreover, considering the absence of agreement on the definition of ‘‘philosophy’’
even among Western philosophers, the vicious circle in Feng’s work cannot be
avoided.67 Along with this argumentative absence comes the second aspect of sen-
sitivity, namely the presence of emotions. Feng’s claim—addressed only to Chinese
readers—that a Chinese indigenous term could just as well characterize both Chi-
nese and Western thought were it not for some practical, organizational inconven-
iences, is a first indication of his personal involvement as a member of Chinese cul-
ture. This is further confirmed by a close comparison of the remaining passage in the
Chinese and English editions:
[Chinese] Although the philosophy of Chinese philosophers lacks formal system, if one
were to say that the philosophy of Chinese philosophers lacks any real system, then it
would be equivalent to saying that the philosophy of Chinese philosophers amounts to
nothing, that China has no philosophy. . . .
According to what has just been said, if the philosophy of a philosopher can be labeled
philosophy, then it must have a real system. What is called the system of a philosophical
system refers to the real system of a philosophy. Although the formal system of the philos-
ophy of the Chinese philosophers is not as good as that of Western philosophers, in fact
the real system is there.68
[English] It may be admitted that Chinese philosophy lacks formal system; but if one were
to say that it therefore lacks any real system, meaning that there is no organic unity of
ideas to be found in Chinese philosophy, it would be equivalent to say that Chinese phi-
losophy is not philosophy and that China has no philosophy. . . .
According to what has just been said, philosophy in order to be philosophy must
have real system, and although Chinese philosophy, formally speaking, is less systematic
than that of the West, in its actual content it has just as much system as does western
philosophy.‘‘69
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To avoid the risk of over interpretation, I will refrain from lingering over the small
differences between these two versions. Like Hu Shi, Feng Youlan hardly argues for
the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy. Denying this is clearly unthinkable and only
arouses indignation, especially in the Chinese edition: ‘‘it would be equivalent to
saying that the philosophy of Chinese philosophers amounts to nothing, that China
has no philosophy’’—in other words, that China and its ancient intellectual tradition
is culturally inferior.70
It is far from my intention to argue that Hu and Feng merely evidenced strong
feelings combined with weak arguments. On the contrary, the absence of a solid ar-
gument for the existence of Chinese philosophy shows that however new their inter-
pretation was, Chinese philosophy belonged to the background of their reflections
rather than the foreground, that it was largely assumed rather than in need of sound
proof, and that it was too obvious and crucial to be called into question. Their con-
cern was with ‘‘Chinese’’ rather than with ‘‘philosophy.’’ They occasionally joined
the Western discussion of what ‘‘true philosophy’’ was, but mainly in order to use
the concept as it seemed obvious to them, in order revitalize their own tradition
and empower their endangered nation. Feng Youlan’s intention, especially in the
Chinese edition, was as much to teach his Chinese audience about the nature and
advantages of philosophical interpretation as it was to convince Western philoso-
phers that China also had a philosophy.71
Reactions to Something Intimately Strange at the End of the Twentieth Century
Now that Chinese philosophy has become a common concept in contemporary
China, after almost a century of academic activity in the field, it has again turned
into a subject of reflection, an unsolved problem. According to Chen Jian, it is a fish-
bone that remains stuck in the throats of Chinese philosophers.72 Doubts are grow-
ing about the digestion of this foreign ingredient in the Chinese body of thought. The
sensitivity of the matter has not decreased with this strangeness lodged within the
daily practices of many professionals. The silence of most contemporary scholars
on the topic and the emotional commitment of others confirm that the legitimacy of
Chinese philosophy is still, as Ge Zhaoguang puts it, ‘‘a very serious and even sacred
matter.’’73
The silence of the majority lies in the fact that most scholars in the field simply
do not discuss the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy.74 They either assume that it
exists or, if pressed to answer, come up with a simple definition in the style of Hu
Shi and Feng Youlan.75 It is usually presented or briefly discussed in the preface or
a footnote, as a stepping stone toward more interesting matters.76 There is no harm
in this, since we all think and work against a background of shared terms, current
discussions, common concerns, old habits, and new vogues.77 Nobody is expected
to provide a rational foundation for each and all of them before discussing specific
matters. Nor would this be possible, since every foundation can again be further
questioned and hence demand more foundation. But, of course, one can reflect on
one’s background and question specific habits or assumptions. Philosophers have a
tendency to do exactly that. While Chinese philosophy is one of those entities that
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are embedded in institutional structures, journals, and conferences, the question of
its legitimacy is one that can be fruitfully reflected upon.
This is indeed what has happened since the end of the twentieth century, when
the ‘‘legitimacy of Chinese philosophy’’ gained the status of hot topic in the field. As
a result, a drastic increase in subtlety and variation has occurred both in the argu-
mentation and the emotions involved, too abundant to describe here in a few sen-
tences. As to the former, one recurring line of argumentation correctly points out that
the problem cannot be simply solved because of the absence of a transparent defini-
tion of philosophy as an absolute norm against which the ancient Chinese texts
could be checked; there is no fa (standard) to determine the hefaxing (legitimacy,
appropriateness).78 This impossibility of providing a conclusive proof for the legiti-
macy of Chinese philosophy does not necessarily indicate an argumentative weak-
ness, but perhaps indicates, on the contrary, a growing involvement in philosophical
discourse. Among the wide variety of emotions involved, there are mild or strong
instances of the following: a concern with the Chinese cultural legacy, an awareness
of crisis, feelings of challenge, indignation about Western arrogance and cultural im-
perialism or Chinese criticism,79 excitement about China’s revival,80 dissatisfaction
with the quality of Chinese philosophy,81 enthusiasm for new intellectual currents,
and a growing sense of autonomy and confidence.82 All in all there is a dominance
of positive feelings, a willingness to improve the quality of contemporary Chinese
philosophy,83 and a hope for respect, recognition, and true dialogue with the
West.84
As there is nothing wrong with the absence of a conclusive argument in favor of
Chinese philosophy, the presence of some sort of emotional commitment is not ob-
jectionable either. It demands some courage to admit this commitment in publica-
tions for a Western audience. Not surprisingly, some scholars mention their previous
disappointment or embarrassment in contact with Western philosophers only after
they declare the problem solved. Toward the end of his Short History of Chinese Phi-
losophy Feng Youlan indicates that he has ‘‘been somewhat embarrassed’’ when
asked about the contribution of Chinese philosophy to the philosophy of the world.
But ‘‘now that the reader has gained some acquaintance with the traditions of Chi-
nese philosophy,’’ Feng feels more confident about answering these questions.85 Lao
Sze-kwang also concludes by stating that he ‘‘had been puzzled and disappointed’’
by ‘‘the lack of communication between philosophical societies with different tradi-
tions’’ before he realized that ‘‘the obstacle was in the concept of philosophy’’ and
that, by this insight, was presumably removed.86 More important than this emotional
commitment is how one relates to it. And this, together with the vagueness of the
term philosophy, is the point on which I would like to dwell for a while.
IV. ‘‘(Chinese) Philosophy’’ as a Proper Name
The sensitivity surrounding the status of Chinese philosophy is often seen as a draw-
back, something immature to be overcome by a more scientific or rational approach.
This view is related to one’s understanding of the nature of the concept of ‘‘philoso-
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phy.’’ Chen Jian speculates that the term ‘‘philosophy’’ is unproblematic for West-
erners, since they first invented it and were thus free to use it like a personal or
proper name (mingzi 名字) for any type of thought that they wished to label as
such. But when the Chinese took over this foreign label a century ago, it had be-
come a generic noun, so that they are now confronted with the question of whether
this noun (ming 名) is appropriate (zheng 正) for the type of thought that has retro-
spectively been labeled by it.87 The argumentation surrounding its identification
with the ancient Chinese masters confirms that since its introduction in China, ‘‘phi-
losophy’’ has indeed been considered a generic noun. But even in the West, ‘‘philos-
ophy’’ has never merely functioned as a proper name, an arbitrary label of some
author’s thought. If that had been the case, there would have been little sense in dis-
cussing its characteristics and criteria. We know that from its very conception on
Greek soil, ‘‘philosophy’’ was a debated term among Socrates’ disciples and was
never used as a merely personal label. The expectation of rational argumentation
and the possibility of debate is thus related to the view of ‘‘philosophy’’ not as a per-
sonal name but as a generic term.88
But fixation on this argumentation has a pernicious consequence, namely that
attention is being constantly diverted from something else: the emotions surrounding
the question and the ineffectiveness of arguments to solve it. My focus on this aspect
of the problem is not meant to dismiss all the rational arguments that have been
brought up by others, but rather to supplement them with a positive appreciation of
their limitations. I have argued elsewhere that Wittgenstein’s idea of family resem-
blances could be used, and not only negatively, in order to discourage the search
for a common essence dwelling behind all the manifestations of philosophy,89 but
also to highlight something positive.90 The members of a family may not all share a
common essence, but there is something else that binds them: a family name. In
contrast to a generic noun, whose meaning may be the object of debate, the average
family name is something arbitrary and largely devoid of meaning. It has no abstract
essence and cannot be defined. The sensitivity of discussions concerning philosophy
also lies, I believe, in the fact that this term, to some (even though minor) extent,
functions like a family name.91
The history of philosophy in the West can then be read as the chronicle of a
large family or clan. Descendants are usually born through the study of philosophy,
then lecturing and publishing in it. Now and then a bastard is spawned, from litera-
ture, linguistics, history, or anthropology, whose right to the family name is unclear
or disputed. As in many families, adoption can incite protest, particularly when
many foreign masters come to claim the name. Some family members simply do
not want an outsider to adopt their name, even though they do not quite know why
they are themselves deserving of that name. Their protest cannot be adequately
founded because there are no defensible criteria or intrinsic reasons to deny this
name to others. But the absence of a crystal-clear criterion of what exactly philoso-
phy is only makes the question that much more sensitive.
Therefore, however intimate a proper name is, it also remains ex-timate.92 Its
‘‘unhomeliness,’’ according to Rudi Visker, is due to a lack of control: one does not
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choose it, nor can one determine what it means, what privileges or duties are
attached to it. The emptiness of the family name thus maintains uncertainty concern-
ing not only the question of who has rights to it but also the responsibilities it
imposes. ‘‘The name, as it were, always leaves its job half done, it suggests that there
is something proper to its bearer, but there is never ‘enough’ of the name to know
what that something consists in, and yet always ‘too much’ to simply ignore what it
thus singles out.’’ One must hold the name high, but what are its demands? We are
attached to something that remains inaccessible to us; we are rooted in our ‘‘uproot-
edness.’’ This passive relation to one’s name forces the subject out of its own center.
The subject is thus ‘‘attached to something to which it does not find access and from
which it cannot rid itself, because it is that to which it owes its singularity.’’93
Our Chinese colleagues find themselves in a somewhat different predicament:
while their academic activity also derives meaning from the framework within which
they operate, they are aware that one of their forefathers was an adopted child.94
They know that even after a century, Western philosophers often do not consider
them family members of equal standing. Some of them reject the adoption and
prefer to function without the name and demands of ‘‘philosophy.’’ Fu Sinian once
remarked in a private letter to Gu Jiegang: ‘‘I do not approve of Mr. Hu Shi’s desig-
nation of the records of Laozi, Confucius, Mozi, et al. as the history of philosophy.
China did not originally have a so-called philosophy; thank god for giving our tribe
such a healthy practice.’’95 He also once declared German philosophy the result of
‘‘the bad habits of the German language.’’96 But the majority of our Chinese col-
leagues, following Feng Youlan or Hu Shi, propose that the masters do belong to
the great philosophical family. Only some among that majority demand or predict
that the family will adapt itself to its adopted children.97
Another difference is that ‘‘philosophy’’ in China probably has fewer proper-
name qualities than in the West. Indeed, it tends more toward a generic noun. Since
it became part of the expression ‘‘Chinese philosophy,’’ the name ‘‘Philosophy’’ in
itself has lost some of its sensitivity to the name ‘‘Chinese’’: while the former may
retain something foreign, the latter indicates home. ‘‘Chinese’’ contains characteris-
tics of a proper name more clearly than the term ‘‘philosophy’’ does: nationality as
the name of one’s group.98 Again, there is an attachment to being American or Eu-
ropean, French or Chinese, although we do not know what exactly these names
mean. In his analysis of attitudes toward national feelings in terms of attachments to
proper names, Visker identifies two opposite attempts to re-center the de-centered
subject. The former is the sort of nationalism (or other types of particularism) that
tries to fill in completely the emptiness that comes with a name. It admits that people
are attached to something and believes that they can get total access to it. Confident
statements about the essence of being Chinese are instances of this strategy. The op-
posite attempt can be associated with universalism, which sees the particular name
as something irrelevant, since it is arbitrary and impossible to describe uniquely. In
their opposition to the essentialist claims of particularism, universalists stress the fact
that Chineseness simply does not exist, thus rejecting expressions of particularistic
attachment as nationalistic delusions. Both are attempts—very common but mis-
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guided, according to Visker—to regain control, to undo the uncomfortable position
of finding oneself attached to something that one does not totally know, something
one has not actively attached oneself to. One reason why we can never know with
certainty whether ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ is a proper (zheng) name (ming) is precisely
because it has some features of a proper name.
V. Attachments to (Chinese) Philosophy
The description of ‘‘Philosophy’’ as a proper name is not proposed here as a theory
on names, but rather as an analysis of attachment. A proper name—one’s family
name or nationality—can be seen as paradigmatic for something that is both sensi-
tive and yet relatively meaningless, such as one’s gender, race, or species. We are
attached to it without knowing exactly what it is. To the admittedly minor extent
that ‘‘(Western) Philosophy’’ and ‘‘Chinese (Philosophy)’’ function like proper names,
we belong to them as to our family or tribe.99 This type of belonging, combining
familiarity with the ultimately unfamiliar, can shed light on the sensitivity of the
question.
A first characteristic of a family or tribe is that its common norms and daily hab-
its are largely implicit. The parochial context predates and shapes the subject; few
things are more irritating for an outsider than these meaningless habits. Implicit
views of philosophy, as one largely acquires them during one’s academic training
in a particular setting, are like habits. Most philosophers in the West do not reflect
at length about the definition of philosophy before excluding the Chinese masters.
This rejection belongs to the background of philosophical activity, while its accep-
tance has largely lived an equally implicit life in China. Many Chinese scholars,
sinologists, and some Western philosophers are vexed by this implicit exclusion of
Chinese philosophy on the basis of what they consider exclusively Western and
even modern criteria.100 Robert Solomon warns against getting ‘‘trapped and suffo-
cated by our own history’’ now that our philosophy ‘‘has become a constricted, op-
pressive, and ethnocentric one,’’ so that not only other cultures but also the Western
premodern past risks being excluded.101
But when contemporary Western scholars seriously reflect on the meaning of
philosophy, as philosophers occasionally do, they tend to disagree with these im-
plicit norms and with each other. In their reflections, a second characteristic of fam-
ily bonding is often revealed, namely emotional commitment, predominantly one of
pride. For instance, one can say of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, and Guat-
tari that each in his own way seems to be thinking of philosophy as a tribal activity,
something particular to his own culture.102 Even though they consider philosophy
universal in its ambitions, claims, interest, relevance, or historical evolution, they
are fascinated by the early Greeks as by their own ancestors.103 They are proud of
philosophy in a way that a Chinese may be proud of shadowboxing. And they reject
the idea of an ancient ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ just as Chinese people would deny that
the West has always had its Ta´ijiquan. Scholars of Chinese thought tend to be more
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proud of the Chinese intellectual heritage—whether or not labeled as philosophy—
than about philosophy.
This combination of implicit ethnocentrism and explicit cultural pride may
sound like a comfortable position. But the analogy with the proper name further sug-
gests a third characteristic, namely a dimension of strangeness in one’s own home.
Belonging to a certain family or tribe is beyond one’s personal control: not only it is
a given and not-chosen fact; its meaning is also largely determined by others. From
very early on in life, one is identified by others as belonging to that family. The fact
that we have not consciously and carefully chosen a certain family does not make
the bond any weaker. On the contrary, consciously chosen bonds—for example,
marriage or adoption—often turn out to be the weakest in a family.104 The emo-
tional commitment that ensues from these bonds is complex. Pride is only one
possible part of it and a rather intriguing one. But there are often other emotions
involved in one’s belonging to a tribe, such as love and concern, but also embarrass-
ment, shame, or even guilt. Without having chosen to be American or Chinese, one
nevertheless feels attached to one’s nationality: proudly or shamefully, gratefully or
reluctantly, or a mixture of all these and other emotions.
Fourth, the strongest type of attachment is probably not to the family into which
one is born, but to one’s own children. Although parents nowadays can choose to
have children, they cannot (yet) determine how a child will be. However it turns
out, parents tend to love it dearly. They know that this feeling does not depend on
a judgment concerning the child’s character or features, but on the mere fact that this
child happens to be theirs. Since parents know that their attachment is deeper than
all the good reasons they can give in support of it, they can accept a neighbor’s rel-
ative indifference toward their child. Although they may occasionally expound on
the many reasons for their pride, they also consider it a matter of good taste not to
overdo this. One can be impressed by one’s own tradition and give descriptions of
its merits, but recognition and admiration by others cannot be forced. There should
always be some acceptance of the failure of argumentation in this matter. Overly
self-confident statements on the nature of Chinese philosophy and insistence on its
absolute superiority in the world are not only a breach of good manners, but they
also indicate one’s incapacity to stand the predicament of being, in Visker’s terms,
de-centered.105 Milder and tentative reflections suggest, paradoxically, a more con-
fident acceptance of this predicament.106
Fifth, besides a lack of control over one’s emotional entanglement and the limits
of argumentation, family relations are also characterized by a failure to understand
fully. Deleuze and Guattari explicitly distinguish their reflection on the nature of phi-
losophy from hurried thoughts on the topic, such as when ‘‘one kept asking the ques-
tion, but too indirectly or obliquely, too artificially, too abstractly, and one exposed
on it, dominated it, in passing rather than being grabbed by it. . . . One was too eager
to do philosophy, so that one failed to ask oneself what it was.’’ The reflection they
undertake is not young or overly confident, but comes with old age, occurs at
midnight, when one wonders: ‘‘But what is it that I have been doing all my
Carine Defoort 641
(AutoPDF U8 7/7/06 15:13) UHP (7"10") Optima J-1559 Philosophy East & West, 56:4 PMU:I(CKN[A])6/7/2006 pp. 618–674 1559_56-4_05 (p. 641)
life?’’107 Perhaps because ‘‘philosophie’’ in French is a female noun, the authors’
approach reminds one of a loving and lucid husband who, after several decades of
married life, still wonders about the peculiarities of his wife’s character, the mysteries
of his most intimate companion. Philosophy loses her air of transparency as one re-
ally tries to see through her mysteries. According to Derrida, philosophy is never a
given: despite the fact that philosophy is from our soil, it has always retained some-
thing foreign: ‘‘Under her Greek name and in her European memory, she has always
been a bastard, hybrid, grafted, multlinear, polyglot.’’108 Concise definitions and
general statements in footnotes or prefaces concerning the definition of philosophy
are usually no indications of a close acquaintance with her.
And finally, we tend to forget that philosophy is a ‘‘love’’ affair that one has with
‘‘wisdom.’’ Love affairs are not always as innocent as the lifelong fascination with
one’s partner: they make philosophers jealous, uncertain, and unfair toward others.
Although the philo for sophia—the ai 爱, which does not occur in Chinese neolo-
gisms for ‘‘philosophy’’109—is usually understood as a continuous search for wis-
dom or some form of blissful contemplation, it may also be seen as a source of pain-
ful contention and unfair exclusion.110 It is easy to recognize the threat posed by the
enormous Chinese corpus of texts to the average Western professor, who will never
master its difficult scripts. Like a jealous husband, he rejects the Chinese rival with-
out knowing him. This mechanism of exclusion on a more philosophical level is
analyzed by Wu Xiao-ming as the ‘‘relation of philosophy with the irreducible other
that it nevertheless endeavors to reduce.’’111 The aim of Western philosophy is to
determine its own identity by excluding the other: China. Chinese thought is pre-
sented as nonphilosophy, the limit of philosophy, its proper other. Being ‘‘the only
discourse that has ever intended to receive its name from itself,’’112 philosophy thus
reappropriates the other as exactly that what is excluded.
The six family features that I have identified with attachments to ‘‘Chinese’’ and
‘‘philosophy’’—implicit norms, parochial pride, lack of control, limits of argumenta-
tion, lack of knowledge, and jealousy—are only part of a larger picture. On the one
hand, much more could be said about the role of pride, identification, and recogni-
tion in this matter. But on the other hand, the question of the legitimacy of Chinese
philosophy should not be reduced to that. Of course, rational arguments and histor-
ical data, as presented by Raud and a large group of contemporary Chinese scholars,
retain their relevance, as long as one respects their limits. The silence surrounding
the disagreement, the relative inefficiency of arguments, and the emotional commit-
ment to the topic suggest that something crucial is being left out: the uncomfortable
predicament of being attached to something that one has no access to. Although
increasing cultural contacts may allow Western and Chinese scholars to become
more familiar with each other, and thus perhaps—not necessarily—to understand
and appreciate each other better, there will always be some attachment to tribal hab-
its, as there is to one’s own children. The lack of a perfect mutual understanding may
be counterbalanced by some understanding of why we do not totally understand
each other.
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a typology of four positions. For other typologies of views in this debate, see
Chen Duoxu, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexueshi xiezuo xiangguan wenti de taolun shup-
ing,’’ pp. 29–30; Chen Wenjuan, ‘‘Qiantan ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’
wenti,’’ p. 44; and Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de
xushu fangshi,’’ p. 13 n. 2.
14 – In his discussion preceding this one in the present issue of Philosophy East
and West, Raud seems to consider my article an attempt to ‘‘settle’’ the matter,
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and my family model a way to solve the problem. In fact, I try rather to ana-
lyze one cause of the unsolvable and unsettled state of the debate. See sec-
tions 4 and 5 below.
15 – Unlike many others, Zheng Jiadong clearly distinguishes between ancient
‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ and its contemporary continuation (Zheng Jiadong,
‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexueshi’ xiezuo yu Zhongguo sixiang chuantong de xiandai
kunjing,’’ p. 3). Li Ming considers only the latter to be ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’
(Li Ming, ‘‘ ‘Zhongguo zhexue’,’’ p. 9). Michael Friedrich and Joe¨l Thoraval
even question the legitimacy of contemporary Chinese philosophy (Friedrich,
De Inventione Sinarum Philosophiae, p. 4, and Thoraval, ‘‘Expe`rience con-
fuce`enne et discours philosophique,’’ pp. 70–72).
16 – With Feng Youlan, I consider premodern the period that precedes the large-
scale introduction of Western thought and institutions in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. For Hu Shi, modern thought begins with Song-
Ming philosophy.
17 – Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, ‘‘Chinese Philosophy,’’ pp. 746–747.
18 – See Thoraval, ‘‘De la philosophie en Chine a´ la ‘Chine’ dans la philosophie,’’
pp. 9–10, and section 2, topic 10 below.
19 – See also Gan Chunsong, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhongguo,’’ p.
191.
20 – See, for instance, Mou Zongsan, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang, pp. 1–3; Ren
Jie, ‘‘ ‘Zhongguo youwu zhexue’ zhi wo jian,’’ p. 5; and Zheng Jiadong,
‘‘‘Hefaxing’ gainian ji qita,’’ pp. 4–6.
21 – See, for instance, Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, ‘‘Chinese Philosophy,’’ pp. 744–
745; Peng Guoxiang, ‘‘Hefaxing shiyu yu zhutixing,’’ p. 38; Zhang Zhiwei,
‘‘Zhongguo zhexue haishi Zhongguo sixiang,’’ p. 18; Hu Jun, ‘‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue’ ‘hefaxing’ taolun de hefaxing wenti,’’ p. 76; Yang Haiwen,
‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie Zhongguo zhexueshi,’’
pp. 10–11; and Chen Renren, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo
zhexue de zijue,’’ pp. 17–18. Thoraval and Lao Sze-kwang suggest to avoid
essentialist discussions and instead work with a strategic definition, stating
clearly what one calls philosophy before making further assessments on the
nature of the Chinese texts. For Thoraval, see his ‘‘Expe`rience confuce`enne
et discours philosophique,’’ pp. 67–68; for Lao Sze-kwang, see his ‘‘On Un-
derstanding Chinese Philosophy,’’ p. 267. I believe that this suggestion over-
estimates one’s control over the term ‘‘philosophy’’ and underestimates its
current emotive force; see sections 4 and 5 below.
22 – See Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,’’ pp. 49–50, 54.
Ge considers it ‘‘a false question’’ but ‘‘full with true history and true feelings’’
(Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Wei shenme shi sixiangshi,’’ p. 24). See also Zhang Liwen,
‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘ziji jiang’ ‘jiang ziji’,’’ p. 2.
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23 – See, for instance, Zhang Dainian, Zhongguo zhexue dagang, p. 2; Li Zhong-
hua, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de licheng,’’ p. 55; and Feng Youlan, cited in section
3 below (under ‘‘The Introduction of Something New . . .’’).
24 – Hegel thought that Confucius was ‘‘only a man who has a certain amount of
practical and worldly wisdom—one with whom there is no speculative phi-
losophy. We may conclude from his original works that for their reputation it
would have been better had they never been translated (Hegel, Hegel’s Lec-
tures on the History of Philosophy, pp. 120–121). He also discusses the Yijing
and the Laozi, but concludes that ‘‘if Philosophy has got no further than to
such expressions, it still stands on its most elementary stage. What is there to
be found in all this learning?’’ (p. 125).
25 – See Du and Zhang, Delida zai zhongguo jiangyanlu, p. 139. In an interview,
the Chinese scholar Wang Yuanhua tells about his conversation with Derrida
at the diner table in Shanghai. As their most important topic of conversation
he cites Derrida’s claim that ‘‘China has no philosophy, only thought’’ (my
italics). I conjecture that this ‘‘only’’ is no literal citation of Derrida’s words,
but was added by Wang Yuanhua. He reports that ‘‘the people at the table
were stunned,’’ and, like most Chinese scholars citing this event, he naturally
interprets this statement as rather dismissive of the Chinese intellectual tradi-
tion. See, for instance, Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue mianlin de tiaozhan
he shenfen chongjian,’’ p. 93; Zhang Liwen, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘ziji jiang’
‘jiang ziji’,’’ p. 4; Yang Haiwen, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu
chongxie Zhongguo zhexueshi,’’ pp. 11, 14; and Chen Zhiliang, ‘‘Lun dang-
dai Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhong de qianyan wenti,’’ p. 75. Some scholars
do not understand Derrida’s remark as being particularly dismissive. See
Zhang Zhiwei, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue haishi Zhongguo sixiang,’’ pp. 17–18,
and Chen Renren, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de
zijue,’’ p. 15.
26 – Heidegger, Was ist das—Die Philosophie? p. 13.
27 – See, for instance, Chen Shaoming, ‘‘Chongti ‘Zhong zhexue’ de zhengdang-
xing,’’ p. 35, and Thoraval, ‘‘Expe`rience confuce`enne et discours philosophi-
que,’’ pp. 75–79.
28 – Many scholars make this point using the ‘‘forced feet’’ saying. See Ge Zhao-
guang, Zhongguo sixiang shi, pp. 763–764; Peng Yongjie, ‘‘Lun Zhongguo
zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,’’ p. 27; Chen Duoxu, ‘‘Zhongguo
zhexueshi xiezuo xiangguan wenti de taolun shuping,’’ p. 30; Qiao Qingju,
‘‘Xifang huayu,’’ p. 68; Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Hefaxing’ gainian ji qita,’’ pp. 5–6;
and Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de xushu fangshi,’’
p. 15. Some scholars tend to forget that this problem is not only intercultural
but also inter-temporal. The expressions yili zhi xue (study of right and princi-
ple) or even daojia (Daoist school) and rujia (Confucian school) are also
anachronistic and thus somewhat forced upon pre-Han masters. For the in-
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evitability of such ‘‘distortions’’ in any act of interpretation, see Defoort, ‘‘Is
There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?’’ pp. 400–401.
29 – Thoraval, ‘‘Expe`rience confuce`enne et discours philosophique,’’ p. 78.
Zhang Xianglong shares this concern (Zhang Xianglong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’,
‘daoshu’, haishi ke daoshuhua de guangyi zhexue?’’ p. 12), but he allows for a
broader view of ‘‘philosophy’’ that includes these practices.
30 – See, for instance, Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Cong ‘zhexue’ dao ‘Zhongguo zhexue’,’’ pp.
31, 33, and Li Jinglin, ‘‘Xifang huayu baquan xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke
hefaxing zhi fansi,’’ p. 22.
31 – Zheng Jiadong remarks that the differences in the study of Chinese philosophy
throughout the twentieth century are only relative since they all rely on tradi-
tional Western norms and jargon (Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de
‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’ p. 5). Ge Zhaoguang indicates another reason to avoid phi-
losophy and its jargon, namely its heavy political associations with Marxism
and materialism in contemporary China (Ge Zhaoguang, Zhongguo sixiang
shi, p. 764).
32 – Ge Zhaoguang clearly distinguishes between using philosophy to interpret an-
cient Chinese texts and declaring them philosophy (Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan
yijian chizun buhe de yishan,’’ p. 53).
33 – See, for instance, Li Ming, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’,’’ pp. 7–8; Zhang Xianglong,
‘‘Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fangfa de duoyuanhua,’’ pp. 14–15; and Jing Hai-
feng, ‘‘Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de xushu fangshi,’’ p. 14.
34 – A total avoidance of such neologisms is impossible and would render contem-
porary Chinese scholars speechless. See Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan yijian chi-
zun buhe de yishan,’’ p. 54; Ren Jie, ‘‘ ‘Zhongguo youwu zhexue’ zhi wo
jian,’’ p. 5; Tang Wenming, ‘‘Gudian jiaohua sixiang de xiandai mingyun,’’
p. 59; Qiao Qingju, ‘‘Xifang huayu,’’ p. 70; and Hu Jun, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’
‘hefaxing’ taolun de hefaxing wenti,’’ p. 77.
35 – See Defoort, ‘‘Chinese Scholars on Chinese Philosophy,’’ pp. 5–6; Defoort, ‘‘Is
There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?’’ pp. 400–401; Ge Zhaoguang,
‘‘Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,’’ p. 54; Zhang Xianglong, ‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue yanjiu fangfa de duoyuanhua,’’ p. 14; and Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Hefaxing’
gainian ji qita,’’ pp. 4–5.
36 – See the preceding discussion by Raud in this issue of Philosophy East and
West; Li Minghui, ‘‘Zhongguo meiyou zhexue ma’’ pp. 144–149; Chen Lai,
‘‘Guanyu ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ruogan wenti qianyi,’’ p. 23; Jing Haifeng,
‘‘Cong ‘zhexue’ dao ‘Zhongguo zhexue’,’’ p. 33; and Chen Zhiliang, ‘‘Lun
dangdai Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu zhong de qianyan wenti,’’ p. 75.
37 – Thoraval, ‘‘Expe`rience confuce`enne et discours philosophique,’’ p. 67. Peng
Yongjie paraphrases the Chinese nationalist reaction of the early twentieth
century as follows: ‘‘As for what others have, we have always had that, too,
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or we now also need to have it, or we will certainly have it in the future’’ (Peng
Yongjie, ‘‘Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,’’ p. 26).
38 – Ritter and Gru¨nder, Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, pp. 572–590.
39 – Ibid., p. 577, referring to Lysis 218a.
40 – Possession of knowledge becomes important in Aristotle’s concept of ‘‘philos-
ophy. The Historisches Wo¨rterbuch extracts various meanings of philosophy
from Aristotle’s work, among which are ‘‘the possession and use of wisdom,’’
‘‘the knowledge of first causes and principles,’’ knowledge for its own sake,
and the godlike act of man (Ritter and Gru¨nder, Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der
Philosophie, pp. 589, 586).
41 – Some Chinese scholars indicate that ‘‘love for wisdom’’ (filo-sophia) charac-
terizes both early Greek and early Chinese thought. See, for instance, Chen
Weiping, ‘‘Xingshang zhihui he shenghuo,’’ p. 13; Ren Jie, ‘‘ ‘Zhongguo
youwu zhexue’ zhi wo jian,’’ p. 6; Li Zhonghua, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de
licheng,’’ p. 54; and Chen Renren ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhong-
guo zhexue de zijue,’’ p. 18. For the rejection of this adaequation, see the
discussion of Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? in part 5
below.
42 – See Ritter and Gru¨nder, Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, pp. 577,
580.
43 – As Li Jinglin points out, the question of what philosophy is and whether an-
cient Chinese thought is philosophy is not a scientific question but is being
asked from within a philosophical position (Li Jinglin, ‘‘Xifang huayu baquan
xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi,’’ pp. 22–23). See also Ren Jie,
‘‘ ‘Zhongguo youwu zhexue’ zhi wo jian,’’ p. 6.
44 – This is the description of philosophy (like 理科 or feilusuofeiya 非录所费亚) in
the Jesuit educational system by Aleni in his Xixue fan (A summary of Western
learning) of 1623 (Standaert, ‘‘The Classification of Sciences and the Jesuit
Mission in Late Ming China,’’ p. 294).
45 – Standaert, ‘‘The Classification of Sciences and the Jesuit Mission in Late Ming
China,’’ p. 315.
46 – See Ritter and Gru¨nder, Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, pp. 731–
732, and also Chen Lai, ‘‘Guanyu ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ruogan wenti
qianyi,’’ p. 21.
47 – The premodern European view of philosophy was at times also very academic
but did not exclude the broader philosophical concern with a good life. Pierre
Hadot attributes this more general philosophical concern to many modern
and contemporary philosophers, including Kant (Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la
philosophie antique? p. 412). Various Chinese scholars argue in favor of a
non-institutionalized form of Chinese philosophy. See Hu Jun, ‘‘‘Zhongguo
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zhexue’ ‘hefaxing’ taolun de hefaxing wenti,’’ p. 77, and Li Jinglin, ‘‘Chongjian
zhexue yu shenghuo de lianxi,’’ pp. 13–16.
48 – Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? pp. 419, 421. In the last quote,
he cites J.-L. Sole`re, who writes about Indian thought. Many Chinese scholars
stress the difference between the focus on theoretical knowledge in (modern)
Western philosophy and the importance of wisdom, experience, education,
and life orientation in Chinese philosophy. See, for instance, Lao Sze-kwang,
‘‘On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,’’ p. 277; Chen Weiping, ‘‘Xingshang
zhihui he shenghuo,’’ p. 13; Zhang Xianglong, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu
fangfa de duoyuanhua,’’ pp. 10–11, and Li Jinglin, ‘‘Xifang huayu baquan
xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi,’’ p. 26. Peng Guoxiang makes
explicit reference to the views of Pierre Hadot (Peng Guoxiang, ‘‘Hefaxing
shiyu yu zhutixing,’’ p. 38).
49 – Mainly Zhongguo zhexue 中國哲學, but also Zhina zhexue 支那哲學. For the
history of terms see Chen Jidong, ‘‘Wailai gainian de Zhexue shifou Zhongguo
guyou?’’ pp. 49–53.
50 – Peng Yongjie, ‘‘Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,’’ p.
26.
51 – Many articles on the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy describe this crucial
period. See, for instance, Zhong Shaohua, ‘‘Qingmo Zhongguoren duiyu
‘zhexue’ de zhuiqiu,’’ pp. 159–189; Thoraval, ‘‘De la philosophie en Chine
a´ la ‘Chine’ dans la philosophie,’’ pp. 9–10; Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan yijian
chizun buhe de yishan,’’ pp. 51–52; Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de
‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’ pp. 3–6; Friedrich, De Inventione Sinarum Philosophiae,
pp. 4–17; Chen Wenjuan, ‘‘Qiantan ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’
p. 44; and Chen Renren, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo
zhexue de zijue,’’ pp. 16–17.
52 – See Ge Zhaoguang, Zhongguo sixiang shi, p. 763, and Li Jinglin, ‘‘Xifang
huayu baquan xia Zhongguo zhexue xueke hefaxing zhi fansi,’’ p. 20.
53 – My view is based on (1) secondary work discussing the topic and quoting the
relevant authors, and (2) prefaces, introductory chapters, and passages explic-
itly discussing the concept of ‘‘philosophy’’ or ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ in writ-
ings by Hu Shi, Cai Yuanpei, Feng Youlan, Zhang Dainian, Liang Shuming,
Mou Zongsan, Ren Jiyu, and others. My reading of their work, however, is
far from complete.
54 – For a discussion of Hu Shi’s and Feng Youlan’s work, see Cua, ‘‘Philosophy in
China: Historiography,’’ pp. 501–505.
55 – Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,’’ p. 50. About the gen-
eral acceptance of the concept of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ in China, see also
Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue mianlin de tiaozhan he shenfen chongjian,’’
pp. 93–94.
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56 – One of them is Jin Yuelin, who—perhaps not coincidently—studied Western
philosophy and lived abroad for nine years. See ‘‘Shencha baogao, 2,’’ pub-
lished as an appendix to Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi. Another critic is
Fu Sinian, quoted in part 4 below. Others were Zhang Zhidong, Wang Guo-
wei, Liang Shuming, and even Hu Shi himself, at some point in their careers.
For Hu Shi, see Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,’’ p. 52,
and Gan Chunsong, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhongguo,’’ p. 192.
57 – Hu Shi, Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang, p. 1.
58 – Chen Jian also remarks that ‘‘Hu Shi does not directly treat the question as
to whether China originally had philosophy’’ (Chen Jian, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue
heyi neng chengli,’’ p. 4).
59 – Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 1–6.
60 – Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi, p. 1.
61 – Feng Youlan adds that these three fields are now named: ‘‘theory of the world,
theory of life, and theory of knowledge’’ (Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi,
p. 2). He mentions the following division: ‘‘metaphysics, ethics, epistemology,
logic, etc.’’ (Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 1). As for its
method, he insists—to Chinese readers alone—that ‘‘philosophy is a product
of rationality. If philosophers want to set up a theory/truth (daoli), they must
do it on the basis of argumentation and evidence’’ (Feng Youlan, Zhongguo
zhexue shi, p. 6).
62 – Fung Youlan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 1.
63 – Feng Yu-lan, Zhongguo zhexue shi, pp. 7–8.
64 – Wu Xiao-ming, ‘‘Philosophy, Philosophia, and Zhe-xue,’’ p. 433.
65 – See Standaert and Geivers, ‘‘Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-lan): Works on the history
of Chinese Philosophy,’’ p. 264. In Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese
Philosophy—which, according to Derk Bodde, is ‘‘written with the Western
reader specifically in mind, which means that its treatment and subject matter
are not always the same as they would be in a book intended solely for a
Chinese public’’ (p. xiii)—Feng defines philosophy as ‘‘systematic, reflective
thinking on life’’ (p. 2). A whole section in Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexueshi
xinbian (pp. 9–16) is on the definition of philosophy, largely based on Lenin’s
thought.
66 – Concerning the vagueness and vicious circle of Feng’s concept of philosophy,
see also Gan Chunsong, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhongguo,’’ p.
191.
67 – Heidegger also describes the attempt to understand philosophy as a circle,
since it is done from within philosophy itself (Heidegger, Was ist das—Die
Philosophie? p. 19). See also Deleuze and Guattari in part 5 below.
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68 – Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi, pp. 13–14.
69 – Fung Yulan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 4; his italics.
70 – Also discussed by Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’
p. 7.
71 – Hu Shi’s intention is to ‘‘make Chinese feel at ease in this new world.’’ ‘‘I have
the strongest desire to make my own people see that these methods of the
West are not totally alien to the Chinese mind, and that . . . they are instru-
ments by means of which and in the light of which much of the lost treasures
of Chinese philosophy can be recovered’’ (Hu Shi, The Development of the
Logical Method in Ancient China, pp. 6, 9).
72 – Chen Jian, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue heyi neng chengli,’’ p. 4.
73 – Ge Zhaoguang, ‘‘Chuan yijian chizun buhe de yishan,’’ p. 54.
74 – Some Chinese scholars mainly express irritation at the debate. Li Zonggui is
convinced that ‘‘normally, this should be obvious without need of any proof.
But recently, because some people with half-baked knowledge have made a
big fuss, and because of the increase in cultural exchange between China and
abroad, and the dissemination of Western philosophy, [some] nonprofession-
als and university students have been influenced by prejudices and believe
that China has no philosophy . . . so that the claim that ‘China has no philoso-
phy’ has become a problem that needs to be clarified’’ (Li Zonggui, ‘‘Bo
‘Zhongguo wu zhexue’ lun,’’ p. 47). Zhang Zhaomin believes that doubts
concerning the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ are mistaken views that
are caused by Western cultural arrogance and by ignorance on the side
of Western scholars and Chinese youngsters, and that they can easily be
resolved by some reflection (Zhang Zhaomin, ‘‘Zhongguo mei you ‘zhexue’
ma?’’ p. 11).
75 – Some contemporary scholars provide a definition or criteria for the concept of
‘‘philosophy.’’ See, for example, Zhang Liwen, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘ziji
jiang’ ‘jiang ziji’,’’ p. 39, and Zhao Jinglai, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing
wenti yanjiu shuyao, p. 39. He Zhonghua begs the question by stating that
although the term ‘‘philosophy’’ (zhexue) did not exist in ancient times, the
matter nevertheless existed since philosophy is something that is universal
(He Zhonghua, ‘‘Zhongguo you mei you ‘zhexue’?’’ p. 3).
76 – Some scholars explicitly mention the uncomfortableness for scholars in the
field to have their whole field (and their identity as philosophers) being ques-
tioned. See, for example, He Zhonghua, ‘‘Zhongguo you mei you ‘zhexue’?’’
p. 2, and Peng Yongjie, ‘‘Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing
weiji,’’ p. 25. Understandably, Chinese scholars of predominantly Western
philosophy identify less with ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ and are more relaxed
about the possible rejection of the term ‘‘philosophy’’ for the ancient Chinese
corpus of texts, especially in its narrow (traditional Western) sense. See Zhang
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Zhiwei, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue haishi Zhongguo sixiang,’’ pp. 18–19, and, to
some extent, Zhang Xianglong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’, ‘daoshu’, haishi ke
daoshuhua de guangyi zhexue?’’ pp. 11–12.
77 – About the absence of interest in this question, see Hu Jun, ‘‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue’ ‘hefaxing’ taolun de hefaxing wenti,’’ p. 75.
78 – See, for instance, Li Minghui, ‘‘Zhongguo meiyou zhexue ma’’ pp. 144–146;
Zhang Liwen, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘ziji jiang’ ‘jiang ziji’,’’ p. 4; Chen
Shaoming, ‘‘Chongti ‘Zhong zhexue’ de zhengdangxing,’’ p. 34; and Chen
Renren, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue de zijue,’’ pp.
17–18.
79 – See, for instance, Li Zonggui, ‘‘Bo ‘Zhongguo wu zhexue’ lun,’’ p. 47; He
Zhonghua, ‘‘Zhongguo you mei you ‘zhexue’?’’ p. 4; and Peng Yongjie, ‘‘Lun
Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,’’ p. 28.
80 – See, for instance, Wei Changbao, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘hefaxing’ xushi ji qi
chaoyue,’’ pp. 8–9.
81 – See, for instance, Peng Yongjie, ‘‘Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de
hefaxing weiji,’’ p. 31; Chen Shaoming, ‘‘Chongti ‘Zhong zhexue’ de zheng-
dangxing,’’ p. 34; Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Zhexueshi leixing yu Zhongguo sixiang de
xushu fangshi,’’ pp. 16–17; and Yu Wujin, ‘‘Yige xujia er you yiyi de wenti,’’
pp. 31–33.
82 – In this respect, see Zhang Liwen, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘ziji jiang’ ‘jiang
ziji’,’’ pp. 4–7, on ‘‘speaking ourselves’’ (自己讲) and ‘‘speaking about our-
selves’’ (讲自己). See also Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’
wenti,’’ p. 11; Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Cong ‘zhexue’ dao ‘Zhongguo zhexue’,’’ p. 31;
Peng Yongjie, ‘‘Lun Zhongguo zhexue xueke cunzai de hefaxing weiji,’’ p.
30; and Chen Renren, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing yu Zhongguo zhexue
de zijue,’’ p. 19. But this self-confidence usually concerns ‘‘Chinese philoso-
phy’’ in its contemporary sense and future possibilities, not always in refer-
ence to the proper way of labeling ancient Chinese thought.
83 – For suggestions about future research, see, for instance, Chen Duoxu,
‘‘Zhongguo zhexueshi xiezuo xiangguan wenti de taolun shuping,’’ pp. 31–
33, and Yang Haiwen, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie
Zhongguo zhexueshi,’’ pp. 13–14.
84 – See, for instance, Gan Chunsong, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue he zhexue zai Zhong-
guo,’’ p. 193; Jing Haifeng, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue mianlin de tiaozhan he shen-
fen chongjian,’’ p. 94; Tang Wenming, ‘‘Gudian jiaohua sixiang de xiandai
mingyun,’’ p. 58; and Chen Wenjuan, ‘‘Qiantan ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de
‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’ p. 47.
85 – Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 332. Feng was writing
more specifically about the contribution of contemporary Chinese philoso-
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phy. The remark, written at the end of his life (quoted at the beginning of this
essay), shows that the recognition by Western philosophers of Chinese philos-
ophy remained problematic throughout his life.
86 – Lao Sze-kwang, ‘‘On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,’’ p. 290.
87 – See Chen Jian, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue heyi neng chengli,’’ pp. 3–4.
88 – I therefore disagree with Yu Wujin, who believes that the acceptance of ‘‘phi-
losophy’’ as a generic term allows for variation and hence stops the debate on
the legitimacy of ‘‘Chinese philosophy’’ (Yu Wujin, ‘‘Yige xujia er you yiyi de
wenti,’’ pp. 28–29). The possible variation is precisely what makes a rational
debate possible. Some authors explicitly characterize ‘‘philosophy’’ as a ge-
neric term. See, for instance, Zhang Dainian, Zhongguo zhexue dagang, p.
2, and Lao Sze-kwang, ‘‘On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,’’ pp. 266–
267, 291.
89 – For this use of Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘‘family resemblances’’ (jiazu leisi家族类
似) in the debate over ‘‘philosophy,’’ see, for instance, Chen Lai, ‘‘Guanyu
‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ruogan wenti qianyi,’’ p. 23; Chen Shaoming, ‘‘Chongti
‘Zhong zhexue’ de zhengdangxing,’’ p. 34; Zhao Jinglai, ‘‘Zhongguo zhexue
de hefaxing wenti yanjiu shuyao,’’ p. 39; and Yang Haiwen, ‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue de ‘hefaxing weiji’ yu chongxie Zhongguo zhexueshi,’’ p. 10. Lao
Sze-kwang explicitly rejects this view in favor of a definition of philosophy
as a reflexive type of thinking that is relevant to life (Lao Sze-kwang, ‘‘On Un-
derstanding Chinese Philosophy,’’ pp. 269, 291 n. 4).
90 – Defoort, ‘‘Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?’’ pp. 407–409.
91 – Raud’s main objection to the family model ‘‘is precisely that in it the head of
the family, who makes the decisions of who can be adopted and who cannot,
is always Western, and the acceptance criteria are not transparent or equal to
all.’’ Raud seems to understand my analogy as a suggestion for solving the
problem, an alternative to the other views in the debate. However, the family
analogy is not meant prescriptively, but rather descriptively, namely to ana-
lyze one cause of the unsolvable debate. The success of ‘‘philosophical bas-
tards’’ like Foucault or Derrida shows that the family has been far less orga-
nized and obedient to the head of the family than what Raud has in mind.
But, indeed, paternalistic and arbitrary exclusion is a major problem in the
field of academic philosophy for both non-white and non-male thinkers, a
fact that can be well understood through this family model.
92 – Visker, Truth and Singularity, p. 19, using Jacques Lacan.
93 – Ibid., pp. 1, 11–13.
94 – The imagery of homelessness to describe the legitimacy crisis has been inde-
pendently explored by Li Jinglin, ‘‘Chongjian zhexue yu shenghuo de lianxi,’’
pp. 14–18, and Qiao Qingju, ‘‘Xifang huayu,’’ pp. 68, 70.
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95 – Fu Sinian, ‘‘Yu Gu Jiegang lun gushishu,’’ p. 374.
96 – This remark is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s well-known characterization of
philosophy as the bewitchment of language. See Fu Sinian (in 1926) as quoted
by Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexueshi’ xiezuo yu Zhongguo sixiang
chuantong de xiandai kunjing,’’ p. 4 n. 1.
97 – They argue for a broad and pluralist sense of ‘‘philosophy,’’ in line with con-
temporary trends in Western philosophy. See Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’ pp. 1–13, and Zhang Xianglong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue’, ‘daoshu’, haishi ke daoshuhua de guangyi zhexue?’’ pp. 12–13.
98 – See Lyotard, ‘‘Le nom et l’exception,’’ p. 51.
99 – Solomon means to criticize Western philosophy by comparing it to a peculiar
tribal preoccupation rather than a universal discipline (Solomon, ‘‘‘What is
Philosophy?’’’ p. 102). See also Fu Sinian quoted above.
100 – See, for instance, Lin, Rosemont, and Ames, ‘‘Chinese Philosophy,’’ p. 748; Li
Zonggui, ‘‘Bo ‘Zhongguo wu zhexue’ lun,’’ p. 48; Chen Jian, ‘‘Zhongguo
zhexue heyi neng chengli,’’ p. 8; and Zheng Jiadong, ‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’
de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’ p. 11.
101 – Solomon, ‘‘‘What is Philosophy?’’’ p. 101. Zheng Jiadong predicts that ‘‘all
that used to be considered eternal, universal, global, obvious models, princi-
ples, judgments, premises etc. . . . will have to be reconsidered as soon as Chi-
nese philosophy is being taken more seriously in the West’’ (Zheng Jiadong,
‘‘‘Zhongguo zhexue’ de ‘hefaxing’ wenti,’’ p. 11).
102 – Derrida was quoted above. For Husserl and Heidegger, see Wu Xiao-ming,
‘‘Philosophy, Philosophia, and Zhe-xue,’’ pp. 419–426 and 427–432. See
also Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? pp. 82–108. Raud,
however, uses precisely their definition of philosophy to sustain his support
for the existence of ‘‘Chinese philosophy.’’
103 – Husserl characterizes philosophy as the disinterested pursuit of ‘‘theoria’’ for
its own sake and, therefore, denies its existence in any other ancient culture,
including the Chinese (Husserl, ‘‘The Vienna Lecture,’’ pp. 279–80). See also
Heidegger, Was ist das—Die Philosophie? p. 13, and Deleuze and Guattari,
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? p. 92.
104 – These bonds are often strengthened by rituals, which are also meaningless
and powerful, more like non-chosen bonds than conscious choices.
105 – Chinese arguments for the superiority of Chinese philosophy over Western
philosophy are too many to quote. I have found them in some writings of,
among others, Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan, Liang Shuming, and Zhang Dai-
nian. See, for instance, Ryden and Defoort, ‘‘The Importance of Daoism,’’
pp. 3–6.
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106 – Examples are Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 1–6; Hu Shi,
The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, pp. 6–10; and Lao
Sze-kwang, ‘‘On Understanding Chinese Philosophy,’’ pp. 265–271.
107 – Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? p. 7.
108 – Derrida, Le droit a` la philosophie du point de vue cosmopolitique, pp. 1, 33.
109 – Zhong Shaohua, ‘‘Qingmo Zhongguoren duiyu ‘zhexue’ de zhuiqiu,’’ p. 188.
For Deleuze and Guattari, this absence of ‘‘love’’ is an important difference
between Western philosophy and Eastern wisdom (Deleuze and Guattari,
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? p. 92).
110 – This reading of ‘‘love’’ (not necessarily erotic) is suggested by some remarks
made by Deleuze and Guattari in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? pp. 14–15.
111 – Wu Xiao-ming, ‘‘Philosophy, Philosophia, and Zhe-xue,’’ p. 409.
112 – Ibid., p. 431.
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